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CASES NOTED
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-RIGHT OF
JAPANESE ALIEN TO FISHING LICENSE
Respondent, a Japanese alien, was denied a fishing license by the Californa Fish and Gaie Commission because of a state statute1 which prohibited the issuance of such licenses to "persons ineligible for citizenship." He
sought to compel the Fish and Game Commission to issue him a license, claiming that the statute denied him the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed
him by the Fourteenth Amendment, Held, that the issuance of the license
will be conipelled, for while discriminatory legislation to protect a special
public interest is not prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no
special public interest present in the instant case to justify the legislation.
Torao Takahashi v. Fish ard Game Commission, 68 Sup. Ct. 1138 (1948).
Japanese aliens are ineligible for citizenship by federal statute but aliens
are guaranteed the same protection afforded by the equal protection clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as is enjoyed by United States citizens., However, the equal protection clause has been interpreted as permitting the states
to legislate in a discriminatory manner, curbing the rights of all or any class
of its residents, when some special public interest of its citizens will be adversely affected if the discriminatory legislation is not permitted;4 and
if the discriminatory classification is reasonably relevant to the protection
of the particular public interest involved. 5 The lower court concerned itself
primarily with the second requisite, the reasonable relevancy of the classification to the end sought.6 The Supreme Court points out that the right to discriminate is a necessary requisite to any classification, reasonably relevant or
otherwise, by reversing the lower court decision on the ground that California's claim of a special public interest by reason of having title to the fish as
trustee for its citizens was insufficient to permit such discriminatory classificatlion.
However, past decisions reveal that a public interest in and title to the
fish are to be distinguished, the latter not necessarily being an essential ingredient of the former. Had the Court in the principal case wanted to find the
requisite public interest independent of the question of title, it might have
1. CA.. Fisri AND GAMEI
ConE §§ 427, 428. 990 (1947).
2. 54 STAT. 1140 (1940), 8 U. S. C. § 703 (1946).
3. Yiek Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886).
4. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 (1885).
5. Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915).
6.Torao Takahashi v. Fish and Game Commission, 30 Cal. 2d 719, 185 P. 2d 805.
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done so by reason of numerous decisions 7 including one leading case8 in which
discrimination against aliens with respect to hunting wild game was permitted.
It is submitted that the requisite public interest did exist in this situation but
was declared non-existent so as to prevent California from invading a field
of exclusive federal power, the regulation of alien admission and exclusion.
Approval of this legislation would be a denial to this fisherman of the right to
work for a living in his chosen occupation, which is equivalent to denying him
the right to remain in that state. 10 When viewed from the perspective that the
requisite public interest will not be found to permit discriminatory legislation
when to so find would allow state legislation to invade a field of exclusive
federal power, the seemingly inconsistent cases previously mentioned may be
reconciled with this decision.1
There seems little doubt that such decisions as that in the instant case,
which refuse to uphold state legislation infringing upon federal power, regardless of the public interest involved, are correct, for to hold otherwise could
conceivably permit the states to legislate a delegated federal power out of
existence.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FREEDOM OF SPEECH AS INCLUDING THE
RIGHT TO BE HEARD THROUGH THE USE OF AMPLIFYING DEVICES
A municipal ordinance prohibited the use of amplifying devices in the
streets and other public places without prior permission from the chief of
police. Defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, after giving four amplified lectures
in a public park, was denied further permission. Nevertheless, he continued to
give such lectures, and was convicted and sentenced under the ordinance. On
an appeal from an affirmance of the conviction by the New York Court of
Appeals, held, that the ordinance is unconstitutional on its face, because it
places the right to be heard in the uncontrolled discretion of the chief of police,
thus violating the guarantee of free speech as protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Saia v. People of New York, 68 Sup. Ct. 1148 (1948) (four
Justices dissenting).
It would appear that the Court has expanded the right of free speech
explicitly to include the right to be heard I through amplification under proper
regulation. The term "right to be heard" is an articulation of what the courts
7. See Note, 39 A. L. R. 350 (1925).
8. Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138 (1914).

9. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698 (1893).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
1. Saia v. People of New York, supra at 1150.

